This paper investigates the impact of firm type and ownership structure on agency costs in UK firms. Prior literature suggests that agency costs are significantly higher when an outsider manages the firm. In this paper, we examine the agency costs associated with different types of firms such as subsidiary, holding, foreign-owned and limited companies. We extend our analysis by examining the agency costs for firms with various levels of diffuse ownership. Consistent with the agency theory, we find that firms with single ownership incur lower agency cost. In addition, we find that the type of firm does contribute to the increase or decrease of agency cost.
Introduction
Literature recognises that diffuse ownership structure may diminish shareholder incentives to monitor managers. In a very diffusely owned firm, the divergence between benefit and costs of monitoring would be larger for the typical owner, thus he can be expected to neglect some tasks of ownership. The more concentrated the ownership, the greater the degree to which benefits and costs are borne by the same owner.
Those who own large fractions of the outstanding shares of a firm either manage the firm themselves or are positioned to ensure that management serves their interests. Managers pursuing their own interests at the shareholders expense will lead to agency problem. The conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders constitute a source of agency costs.
This paper attempts to investigate the effect of firm type and ownership structure on agency costs. The different types of firms such as subsidiaries of wholly owned companies, holding, limited and foreign-owned companies are analysed to identify differences in agency costs. Agency costs are also studied for different levels of ownership ranging from single to more than twenty shareholders. The study uses 75694 currently active companies in UK for which data are available. Our findings indicate that agency cost is significantly higher in firms with diffuse ownership. The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we show the evidence from prior studies with regard to agency costs in general. Section 3 describes the data description and our methodology. We present our results in section 4. The final section provides our conclusion.
Literature Review
The separation between management and the ownership of the firm forms the basis of agency theory. The role of shareholders becomes more passive while management pursues goals which may not necessarily correspond with those of the shareholders of the firm. The agency relationship has been described as: " a contract under which one or more persons (principal) engage another person (agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent " ( Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Fama (1980) states agency costs as those arising from the conflict of interest between the principal and the agent. It has often been argued that managers of a firm may make decisions that conflict with the firm's goal to maximise shareholder wealth. Several examples of costs which stems from this conflict situation include excessive management remuneration, pursuit of sales growth at the expense of profit as well as avoiding investing corporate resources in potentially profitable ventures. If the above costs are observed in a firm, the presence of agency problem can be deduced.
A considerable literature suggests that agency costs can be related to differences in ownership structures. In general, as the number of shareholders increase and share ownership becomes less concentrated, there is less monitoring of managers by shareholders and consequently, lower profitability and productivity. The more ownership in the possession of people not directly involved in the management of the firm, the greater the possibility of conflict. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) build a symmetrical model of ownership and control which state ownership structure will vary in such a manner so as to maximise the value of firm. The more concentrated the ownership, the more the benefits and costs are borne by the same person.
Due to differential agency costs, wholly-owned subsidiaries of foreign firms will perform better than partially-owned subsidiaries (Boardman et. al, 1997 ). More tightly-held subsidiaries will contribute more to overall corporate profits. Corporate managers are rewarded for maximising profits and so will have an incentive to monitor wholly-owned subsidiaries more than partially-owned subsidiaries.
The agency costs of assuring that managers maximise shareholder wealth are normally larger for multinational companies than for domestic firms. Multinational companies with subsidiaries scattered around the world may experience larger agency problems because it is more difficult to monitor managers of distant subsidiaries in foreign countries. Foreign subsidiary managers raised in different cultures may not follow uniform goals set by the company. Larger multinational companies can also create larger agency problems.
The magnitude of agency costs varies with the management style of the company. A centralised management style can reduce agency costs because it allows managers of the parent to control foreign subsidiaries thereby reducing the power of subsidiary manager. However, the parent's managers may make poor decisions for the subsidiary because they are not as informed as the subsidiary managers. A decentralised management style, on the other hand, may result in higher agency cost if the subsidiary managers make decisions that do not focus on maximising the value of the entire company.
Several attempts have been made to study the effect of ownership structure on the behaviour and performance of firms. These studies find significant differences between diffused and concentrated ownership with respect to firm performance. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) examine the use of several mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders. They find direct empirical evidence of relation between firm performance and insider shareholding, outside directors, debt and corporate control activity. Denis et al, (1997) find that large firms tend to be more diversified and this diversification has been shown to be value destroying. Significant negative relationship between ownership concentration and profitability is reported by Leech and Leahy (1991) who studied 470 UK listed firms. Short and Keasey(1999) in their study report a non-linear relation between managerial ownership and firm value for a sample of UK firms.
Ang, Cole and Wuh Lin (2000) present results stating that agency costs are (i) significantly higher when an outsider rather than an insider manages the firm, (ii) inversely related to the manager's ownership share, (iii) increases with the number of non-manager shareholders, and (iv) to a lesser extent, are lower with greater monitoring by banks. Singh and Davidson (2003) extend the work of Ang et al (2000) to large US corporations and find that managerial ownership is positively related to asset utilisation.
Data and Methodology

Sample
The initial total sample compiled in March 2002 from the Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) database was made up of 125953 companies from which we eliminated 50258 companies due to the unavailability of financial data as well as inconsistent shareholder information. This database provides information on the type of firm, ownership structure, financial data and the standard industry codes required for our analysis. The final sample for this study consists of 75694 active UK companies which were then divided into the categories defined in the next section. Nonultimate holding companies with more than 20 shareholders are excluded from our analysis due to insufficient data.
We define as our base category, independent firms which are not holding companies nor are subsidiaries and have only 1 shareholder. We assume firms which fall into the base category incurs the lowest agency cost because the owner owns 100 percent of the firm and divergence of interest between managers and owners does not exist.
Definition
In our sample, we include firms ranging from single shareholder to those with more than twenty shareholders. We divide the firms into nine groups based on the type of firm structures as follows:
(1) independent with single shareholder:
Our base category is made up of firms which have no subsidiary and is not a holding company and have a single shareholder. 
Methodology
We use two alternative efficiency ratios to measure the agency costs. These are similar to ratios used by Ang and Lin (2000) . The first ratio is the expense ratio which is used to measure how effective the management controls operating costs. Lower agency costs should be reflected by a lower expenses-to-sales ratio. Expense ratio is calculated as total expenses divided by sales. Our measure of expenses is slightly different whereby it is derived from the following formula.
Operating expense = gross profit -interest -profit before tax -director's remuneration
The second ratio is the asset utilisation ratio, which is to measure how effectively the assets are being deployed by the management. This is calculated as sales divided by assets or turnover divided by total assets. A large amount of sales that are generated for a given level of asset indicated by high ratio may identify efficient asset management practises. A lower ratio will reflect a considerable agency conflict. A firm experiences positive agency cost if sales-toassets ratio is lower than the base firm.
Results and Analysis
We categorise our sample firms into the core industry sectors following the four-digit UK Standard Industry Code (1992) which is presented in Table I . Our sample show that 31% of firms in the United Kingdom are in the real estate, research, public administration and defence sector. We find the highest concentration of firms with one shareholder in the same sector which also has the highest number of firms which are not ultimate holding.
Results by type of ownership 4.1.1. Expense to sales ratio
We compare the ratios between the different type of firms and ownership structure to our base category sample. For firms with single shareholder and are holding companies have the highest ratio at 95.8%. In theory, firms with higher expenses to sales ratio have higher agency cost. This result suggest that firms with single shareholder and are holding companies have higher agency cost. Our result also suggest that the more the number of shareholders, the higher the ratio as can be seen for firms with more than 10 shareholders.
The ratio of firms with single shareholder is higher than the base sample but the difference in mean is not statistically significant. Firms with single shareholder in the above sample include holding, foreign and limited companies. The result indicate agency cost exist in firms with single shareholder. Table IIb about 
We find the ratio of ultimate holding firms with single shareholder is higher than the base sample. Ultimate holding firms are firms with no holding companies and since these companies are not controlled by any other, the sole shareholder owns 100 percent of the firm.
-
We define limited companies as subsidiaries of public listed companies and our sample includes only those with single shareholder. We find the ratio higher than the base sample and the difference in means is statistically significant. This result implies that agency cost is higher which maybe due to the unaligned interest between the subsidiary and the parent company.
The expense-to-sales ratio for our sample of foreign companies is the second highest among all firm types. Our results suggest that single shareholder firms with foreign parents incur significantly high agency costs. These costs are likely to arise due to the geographic and cultural distance from the parent company. Table IIe about here
Firms which we define as not holding are those which are not ultimate holding companies and they do not have subsidiaries. Our result indicates a lower agency cost which suggests that having single shareholder who maybe a holding company can reduce agency cost.
We extend our analysis by including in our sample, ultimate holding firms with at least 10 shareholders.
In light of the agency theory, we expect the ratio to be high and this is confirmed by our result. These firms have higher ratio and are generally less efficient than the base. Table IIg about here
For firms which are not ultimate holding, the increased number of shareholders produced a higher ratio than the base sample though the increase in agency cost is not statistically significant. This result suggests that agency cost varies with not only with number of shareholders but with the type of firm as well.
We find firms with at least twenty shareholders have very high expenses-to-sales ratio which is consistent with previous studies. This result suggests that agency cost increases as the number of shareholder increases.
Sales to assets ratio
All the firms have lower ratio than the base firm which indicates that positive agency costs exists in these firms. We find that firms which are not ultimate holding companies with single shareholder have the highest ratio. According to the agency theory, agency costs should be inversely related to the ownership of the firm. The higher the ratio is, the more effective the firm utilises its assets, thus it is more efficient and has less agency cost.
---------------------------------Insert Table IIIa about here ---------------------------------
Asset turnover ratio for firm with single shareholder is lower than our base case, indicating positive agency cost. This result suggests that firms will have less agency problem when the ownership is more concentrated. The owner-manager will not have conflict of interest in managing the firm.
---------------------------------Insert Table IIIb about here ---------------------------------
In the above sample, the asset turnover ratio is smaller for holding companies with single shareholder as compared to base, implying that the agency costs are higher than base. This may suggest that holding company management is less efficient than an ownermanager in asset utilisation.
---------------------------------Insert Table IIIc about here ---------------------------------
The asset turnover ratio for limited firms is much lower than the other samples. We defined limited firms as subsidiaries of public listed companies. The low ratio may indicate less efficient asset management and may reflect deployment of assets for unproductive purposes.
--------------------------------Insert Table IIId about here ---------------------------------
Agency costs associated with international ownership varies according to the parent company. It includes geographical, cultural and institutional differences which affect monitoring. The assets turnover ratio which is slightly higher than the others in our sample shows positive agency cost. This may suggest less efficiency and higher agency cost.
---------------------------------Insert Table IIIe about here ---------------------------------
We find the sales to assets ratio significantly high for single shareholder in firms which are not ultimate holding. However this ratio is still lower than the base sample indicating some agency cost. This result is consistent with Table IIe which indicates that these firms have lower expense to sales ratio. Ownermanager of these firms may not have the incentive to pursue their own interest thus reducing the agency cost.
--------------------------------Insert Table IIIf about here ---------------------------------
In general when the number of shareholders increases and ownership becomes less concentrated, agency conflict will increase. This is reflected in our result where ultimate holding firm with at least 10 shareholders has a lower ratio. We compare this with our earlier result of ultimate holding firm with 1 shareholder which show a slightly higher ratio.
---------------------------------Insert Table IIIg about here ---------------------------------
Our sample of the above firms with at least 10 shareholders and not ultimate holding companies shows a relatively high asset turnover ratio. Firms with large number of shareholders do not necessarily indicate lower asset utilisation. This is reflected in our result whereby types of firms contribute to the increase or decrease of agency cost. We find firms which are not ultimate holding seem to show better asset utilization compared to the ultimate holding firms. Table IIIh about here
Consistent with other studies, our sample of firms with at least 20 shareholders has the lowest ratio. This result implies that assets are not effectively managed in these firms due to higher agency cost. The conflict of interest between the shareholders is much larger due to the diffusion in the firm's ownership.
Results from multivariate regression
We regress each of our two proxies for agency cost, the ratio of expenses to sales and sales to assets, against ownership and firm structural variation across the sample.
The agency theory states that:
(i) agency cost increases as the ratio of expenses to sales increases (ii) the higher the sales to asset ratio is, the lower the agency cost
The results of our regression analysis relating expense to sales ratio to ownership structure, is presented in table IVa below. The dependent variable is the expense to sales ratio.
---------------------------------Insert Table IVa about here ---------------------------------
Column 1 in the above table identifies the explanatory variables. In columns 2 to 9, we analyse each of the structure independently. The results are statistically significant for all the firms and we find positive coefficients for column 3 to 9. The results are highest for firms with single shareholder and are holding companies as indicated in our earlier result in Table  IIb . We also find high positive coefficient for firms with more than 20 shareholders and ultimate holding which suggest that the agency cost is higher as ownership is diluted.
In table IVb we present the results of our regression analysis relating sales to assets to ownership structure. The dependent variable is the sales to assets ratio which varies inversely to agency cost. Table IVb about 
The table is constructed similar to table IVa. We analyse the variables independently and we find negative significant coefficient for seven of the variables. This result suggests that when the sales to asset ratio decreases, the agency cost increases implying that these firms are not efficiently managed. We find firms which are not holding companies with more than 20 shareholders has lower coefficient.
Summary and conclusion
Our results are consistent with earlier studies by Jensen and Meckling (1976), Ang et al (2000) and Singh et al (2003) which indicate that agency costs are higher for firms having more than one shareholder. These firms are associated with higher agency costs supporting the theory developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) . The theory stated that at one extreme of ownership are firms whose managers own 100 percent of the firm and these firms have no agency cost.
At the other extreme are firms whose managers are paid employees with no equity in that firm and that the agency costs will be higher. This is because the interests of the firm's managers are not aligned with those of the firm's owners. Agency cost which is an inverse function of ownership will increase as the number of shareholders increases. However, an interesting finding in our result is that type of firm does contribute to the agency costs. Despite the increase in the number of shareholders, firms which are not ultimate holding do not see an increase in agency cost. Future research should explore more of this issue.
Most importantly we find that even for firms with single owner, the type of ownership may influence agency cost. We find firms with foreign parents experience higher expense ratio and lower asset utilisation ratio which are associated with high agency cost.
These costs arise because the owner/manager may consume executive perquisites so that the firm purchases unproductive assets such as office furnishing and fancy office space which are difficult to monitor due to the geographic and cultural distance from the parent country. Similarly, single owners that are ultimate holding tend to have higher agency costs. However, single owner and not ultimate holding companies seem to have lower agency cost.
From the above results, we find that agency cost will increase when the ownership of firms becomes diffuse. We also find evidence that even for a single owner firm, agency cost is dependent on the type of ownership in our study. 
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